crimes and hate violence rising in California"; 7 Mississippi State Senator Bill Minor warned, "this is the type of crime that easily spreads like an epidemic"; 8 ajournalist for the San Francisco Chronicle declared that "hate-motivated violence is spreading across the United States in 'epidemic' proportions." 9 B.
HATE CRIME EPIDEMIC PROPONENTS
The leading proponents of a hate crime epidemic thesis are advocacy groups representing gays and lesbians, Jews, and blacks; advocates for women, Asian-Americans, and the disabled also have demanded explicit inclusion in hate crime legislation. 10 By calling attention to the criminal victimization of their members, these advocates may hope to mobilize law enforcement resources on behalf of their members, and, more broadly, to make out a moral and political claim in furtherance of their groups' agenda of social and political goals.
The existence of a hate crime "epidemic" may be functional for groups like the ADL and Klanwatch. These organizations are committed to preventing and eradicating all bias against those whom they represent as well as obtaining symbolic and material support for their constituents. Whatever the actual number of hate crimes, these groups' assertion of a hate crime epidemic effectively gains them political support. A group uses the term "epidemic" to "focus public attention and resources and create social and behavioral changes." 11 Spokespersons for gays and lesbians probably have been the most persistent proponents of the hate crime epidemic hypothesis. Kevin Berrill, Director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF), asserts that " [t] he problem [of bias crime] is alarmingly pervasive. The real message is not whether the numbers are up or down, but rather that we have an epidemic on our hands, one that is in dire need of a remedy." 12 Similarly, Michael Petreli, a spokesperson for Gay and Lesbian Americans, stated: "[a]nytime there's a murder of a gay or lesbian person, I am concerned because our group... believes there is an epidemic of this kind of anti-gay violence."' 3 After the NGLTF issued its 1993 survey report, a spokesperson for the NGLTF said that "all the anecdotal evidence tells us this is still an outof-control epidemic." 14 Ironically, the NGLTF survey report actually stated that violence against gays and lesbians had decreased by 14% in the six cities surveyed.' 5 Despite this decline, NGLTF spokesperson Tanya L. Domi told a House of Representatives Committee that " [a] nti-gay violence plainly remains at epidemic proportions."' 6 Some women's advocacy groups claim that violence against women constitutes the largest category of hate crime. According to Molly Yard, then-President of NOW, " [w] hen one realizes that rape and wife abuse are the most commonly reported violent crimes in America, it becomes clear that the vast majority of violent crime victims in this country are women. There is widespread agreement among feminists that these crimes against women are motivated by hatred [of women].' 7 Similarly, a Scholastic Update article titled "War on Women" explains: "[a] ccording to statistics from law enforcement and women's advocacy groups, crimes of violence against women are rampant, and they've been increasing for more than a decade."' 8 Asian-American advocacy groups lobbying for passage of the federal Hate Crime Statistics Act claimed that Asian-Americans were experiencing increased hate violence. believe that in California, as well as throughout the nation, there has been an increase in crimes committed against Asians and other minorities which are motivated by racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice." 2 ' William Yoshino of the Japanese American Citizens League stated: " [we] believe there has been a dramatic upward trend in violence toward Asians since 1980."22 These spokespersons and organizations, among others, have successfully created the widespread belief that hate-motivated crimes based on race, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, and disability are overwhelming the United States. This "reality" has provided the foundation for political and legislative "findings" and has spawned a growing body of hate crime law and jurisprudence.
C. THE MEDIA'S ROLE
The media have accepted, reinforced, and amplified the image of a nation engulfed by hate crime. A LEXIS search of news articles from 1993 to 1995 revealed fifty-six stories referring to the "epidemic of hate crime."
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Headlines like the following are typical: "A Cancer of Hatred Afflicts America"; 24 "Rise in Hate Crimes Signals Alarming Resurgence of Bigotry"; 25 "Black-on-White Hate Crimes Rising"; 26 "[A]cross the nation, hate crimes ... are on the increase after years of steady decline" 27 ; and "[t]hroughout the country, there are increasing numbers of shootings, assaults, murders and vandalism that are motivated by bias and hatred.1 28 The alarming state of inter-group relations is "news" while inter-group cooperation is not. A Newsday headline states "Bias Crimes Flare Up in City's Heat"; 2 9 a full five paragraphs later we find out that "the number of bias-related incidents in the city 20 Senate Hearing, supra note 17, at 261 (letter to Senator Paul Simon from Susan C. Lee). 31 The article further reports increases in nearly every major city in the United States. When FBI Director Louis Freeh released the results of the second Hate Crime Statistics Report during a speech in Germany, he told his hosts that hate crime murders are at least as common in the United States as in Germany, which at the time was said to be experiencing a wave of violence against "foreigners." 3 2 The media seem almost enthusiastic in presuming the worst about the state of inter-group relationships in American society. For example, a Florida newspaper presented a horrifying attack on an African-American tourist as "a dramatic example of the growing problem of hate crime," 33 but the writer provided no basis for the assertion that there is a "growing problem of hate."m Sometimes the media may even be responsible for triggering hate crimes. When two African-American children in New York City reported that several whites had sprayed them with white shoe polish, the media gave the incident endless publicity. The week after the alleged attack, sixty-one bias incidents were reported. 3 5 When, weeks later, the New York Police Department effectively abandoned the investigation amid speculation that the original accusation was fabricated, the media hardly covered the story. The authors base their bleak prediction of increasing hate crimes on ecomonic decline having led to social-psychological malaise. Levin and McDevitt believe that "resentment" is at the root of most hate crime offenses. They argue that as Americans are forced to cope with dwindling economic opportunities, they will blame others for taking opportunities away from them. This resentment and frustration, coupled with extant biases and stereotypes, expresses itself through hate crimes; in other words, angry competition over a shrinking economic pie. a 8 This explanation is not based on any empirical studies but on the authors' social speculation. The most significant problem with the authors' speculation is the absence of any data on the hate crime rate. In short, the authors may have created a theory in search of a problem.
In In one chapter, titled "Recent Surge of Racial Violence," Pinkney points the finger of blame at then-President Ronald Reagan: "the point is that Ronald Reagan set the tone and created the environment in which acts of racial violence thrived.... Thus, the widespread physical attacks on blacks and other minorities went unchecked." 45 The bulk of the book is devoted to describing highly publicized incidents of violence, some of which were not clearly attributable to racism. For example, Pinkney characterized the Bernhard Goetz case, in which Goetz, a white man, shot four black youths who were tyring to rob him, as an example of racial violence. Goetz was acquitted. Similarly, when New York City police shot a mentally unstable black woman as she lunged at another police officer with a knife, Pinkney labeled the incident race-based violence. Pinkney's book is not really about hate crimes, nor does it support the existence of an epidemic of anti-black hate crimes. Indeed, only a few of the incidents covered in the book could uncontroversially be characterized as hate crimes. A search in WESTLAW's academic journals files found thirty-one articles published between 1992 and 1995 that contained the phrases "hate crime" and "epidemic." 46 Not one of these articles doubts the existence of an across-the-board hate crime epidemic. To the contrary, a hate crime epidemic is assumed and frequently cited asjustification for new substantive laws, enhanced sentences, and increased enforcement.
Like journalists who write about hate crimes, the academic commentators selectively apply data that do not support "the facts" they claim to establish. For example, Professor Abraham Abramovsky, in a 1992 law journal article advocating more laws to combat bias crime, claims an "urgency of the escalating problem [of bias crime]."47 He asserts that "categories of bias crime are rapidly growing along with the reported number of instances." 48 Yet, the proliferation of bias crime categories does not mean more instances of bias crimes. Rather, increased categories of crime indicates the willingness of law makers to accommodate more advocacy groups' demands.
Professor Abramovsky expresses alarm that, according to the New York Police Department's statistics for the first four months of 1990, there was a twelve percent increase in the number of bias-related crimes over the same period in 1989. 49 He explains that "the most alarming statistic is that in 1990 the number of bias-related attacks on Asians almost doubled from the number reported in 1989." 5 o A footnote provides the detail: "there were 11 bias crimes reported against Asians during the first four months of 1990, compared with 22 reports in all of 1989." 5 1 Is a total of eleven bias incidents against Asian-Americans truly "alarming" in a city with a 1990 Asian-American population of 512,71952 and with a total of 710,222 FBI index crimes? 53 In the final analysis, the total number of anti-Asian attacks for 1990 was the same as the 1989 figure.
4
Eleven reported bias crimes in the first four months of 1990 might reflect random crime fluctuations, the prolific criminality of a single offender or of a clique of teenagers, the energies of one police officer or enhanced data collection efficiency. Abramovsky acknowledges the latter possibility, but cites a National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence (NIAPV) study that "reported a steady increase in hate crimes in the last two years from the majority of agencies who collect such data."
5 5 This begs the question. As efficiency in bias data collection increases, whether by police or by non-governmental organizations (and often in conjunction with each other), and more public attention focuses on the issue, absolute numbers of recorded bias incidents will necessarily increase. Moreover, can comparisons of data over a two-year period really be considered a trend?
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Student law review authors have enthusiastically embraced the existence of a hate crime epidemic. One writer in the Harvard Law Review states, "[i] n recent years, violence, threats, and vandalism committed because of the race, religion, sexual orientation, or other such characteristics of the victim have increased at an alarming rate." 57 The author explains that Congress passed a Hate Grime Bill in 1990 and that the FBI reported 4,558 hate crimes in 1991.58 Where the author finds the "increase," let alone the cause for "alarm," is not explained; apparently it is so obvious that it ought simply to be assumed. One must examine the sources of hate crime data in order to understand how the hate crime epidemic hypothesis has been constructed. Some advocacy groups, such as the ADL, collect data and generate statistics to support their claims that those whom they represent are experiencing an epidemic of bias-motivated victimization. These statistics are used to confirm the "reality" of hate crime. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to critique every advocacy group's hate crime data collection and reporting procedures, we focus on the Since 1979, the ADL has compiled and published an annual audit of "overt acts or expressions" of anti-Jewish bigotry or hostility. 74 The anti-semitic overt acts or expressions included in the report are not necessarily crimes. They include non-criminal verbal harassment and the distribution of anti-semitic literature, such as neo-Nazi literature and anti-semitic materials, to Jews and non-Jews, in public places. 75 Thus, on its face, one cannot rely on the ADL audit as an indicator of hate crime.
The ADL data collection method also contains a great deal of subjectivity. The ADL compiles its statistics from data provided by its twenty-eight regional offices. Each regional office relies upon victim and community group reports, newspaper articles, and local law enforcement agencies for its information.
Individuals and community groups who believe they have been the victims of an anti-semitic incident may call the ADL office. A person at the ADL fills out a standard form, which includes the name of the victim and a description of the incident, and the victim may be encouraged to contact the police. The ADL will then look for newspaper coverage of the incident and attempt to determine whether similar incidents, if any, suggest a pattern. If the incident is an isolated, non-criminal event, like an anti-semitic message left on an answering machine, the ADL officer will listen to the message, and confirm it as "harassment" for purposes of the audit. The ADL attempts to confirm all reports.
The ADL also must determine whether an incident brought to its attention constitutes "an act or expression of anti-semitism." For example, the organization has decided that a stone thrown through a synagogue window, even without any markings or other verbal expression of anti-semitism, evidences hostility towards a Jewish institution. The Annual Audit then includes this act, even though (as the ADL itself acknowledges) one child could have thrown the stone at another Thus, the ADL Audit will necessarily be dominated by "low-end" incidents such as anti-semitic comments, literature and graffiti. The ADL reviews any crime that occurs at a Jewish institution for anti-semitic overtones, regardless of whether the police classify the incident as bias-related. The 1993 ADL Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents lists a "representative sampling" of incidents of anti-semitic harassment. For example, in Connecticut, a high school hockey coach yelled an antisemitic slur, "Get the Jew Boy," at an opposing player. In Georgia, a business owner accused aJewish woman who questioned the price increase of service of "trying to Jew me down." In Massachusetts, 'Jew!" was yelled by a man in a passing truck at a Jewish mourner leaving a cemetery.
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Once an act has been reported and classified as an anti-semitic incident, the ADL attempts to verify it. Validating and investigating property damage is easier to confirm than anonymous reports of personal harassment. Without additional follow-up of reports by unidentified complainants, the ADL states that it may not be possible to include these incidents in its Annual Audit. 78 However, "may" is not "must"; some unidentified, unverified reports "may" be included in the ADL's Audit.
The ADL's dependence upon newspaper stories regarding antisemitic incidents also poses problems. Newspapers vary enormously in their coverage of anti-semitic incidents (especially minor incidents) and in the reliability of their reporting. The propensity to report or not to report bias incidents may have little, if anything, to do with the actual frequency of hate crimes. Perhaps a small town newspaper is more apt to report such incidents because there is less news to report than in a larger urban center. On the other hand, some newspapers in urban centers may have a sizeable readership concerned about antisemitism. Conversely, a newspaper may not deem such behavior as newsworthy in an area where such conduct or expression is routine. Obviously, we lack any data on the criteria and procedures which journalists employ in confirming claims of hate-crime victimization. We do know, however, that a hate crime is more newsworthy than an "ordinary" crime.
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According to its own personnel, the ADL does not purport to be the "end all, be all" provider of anti-semitic statistics.
8 0 Yet, organizations such as Klanwatch and the Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project have followed the ADL's data collection model, and numerous states have based their anti-bias laws on ADL guidelines. 8 '
B. KLANWATCH'S HATE CRIME STATISTICS
An article by Klanwatch, a project of the Southern Poverty Law Center, illustrates how the hate crime epidemic has been constructed on the basis of dubious statistics. In the article "Campus Hate Crime Rages in 1992,"82 Klanwatch claims that there is a "raging hate epidemic" on college campuses. Two types of data are offered to support this claim. First, Klanwatch cites a 1990 report by the NIAPV which states that "25% of minority students will become victims of violence based on prejudice. And 25% of those students will be revictimized, according to a survey conducted by the NIAPV at the University of Maryland at Baltimore." 8 3 Second, the article reports that the "New York State Governor's Task Force on Bias-Related Violence survey of 2,823junior and senior high school students found respondents to be biased against gay and lesbian students."
Klanwatch's conclusion that there is a "raging hate epidemic" on college campuses is questionable. First, Klanwatch does not explain the origin of the NIAPV's twenty-five percent figure. What qualifies as an act of violence? How is a perpetrator identified and his or her prejudice confirmed? Furthermore, the reported NIAPV finding of twenty-five percent conflicts with other data sources. The 1992 National Crime Victimization Survey Report, produced by the Department ofJustice, found only 32.1 crimes of violence per 1,000 persons age twelve and over for all Americans.
8 5 And, while higher, there were still only 50.4 crimes of violence per 1,000 black persons age twelve and over. Klanwatch also fails to explain the link between the New York State Governor's Task Force finding of biased feelings among high school students and acts of hate on college campuses. The same types of questions remain unanswered: How many students responded to the survey? What qualifies as "bias against gay and lesbian students"? Is personal feeling without action "bias"?
C. THE FBI NUMBERS
The 1990 Hate Crime Statistics Act mandated the collection of hate crime data by the United States Department ofJustice. 8 8 Passage of the Act itself was predicated on the uncritical acceptance of a hate crime epidemic in the United States. Sponsors favored a data collection effort to confirm what they already claimed to know: hate crime is rampant in every category. The FBI was assigned the task of promulgating guidelines on the collection of hate crime data. Local police departments were requested to follow the guidelines in preparing their regular crime reports for the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports.
In releasing the first data collected under the Act, then-FBI Director William Sessions stated: "[w] hile these initial data are limited, ... they give us our first assessment of the nature of crime motivated by bias in our society." 8 9 However, it is questionable whether this "assessment" provides any useful information. Only thirty-two state police departments submitted any data. Only 2,771 agencies, 90 of the 12,805 law enforcement agencies nationwide reporting to the FBI, 9 1 participated in the data collection effort; of these, seventy-three percent of the reporting departments reported no hate crime incidences. 92 Even among the participating agencies, data collection methodology varied dramatically from state to state, and municipality to municipality. 93 In 93 The 1990 FBI Resource Book (pre-hate crime bill) compares 11 states' hate data collection methods. In some states, data collection was voluntary, in others it was mandated. Some states provided additional resources for data collection, while others hoped to stretch existing resources to encompass hate crime reporting. In addition, some states applied a much broader definition of what qualifies as a hate crime than others. fact, for 1991 only 4,558 hate crime incidents involving 4,755 incidents were reported for the entire country. 94 "Intimidation," the most frequently reported offense, accounted for one-third of all hate crime offenses against property and accounted for 27.4% of reported hate crimes. 9 5 Despite the spotty nature of the FBI collection effort, and the small number of hate crimes it revealed, the media seized upon these data as confirmation of a hate crime epidemic. A Houston Chronicle editorial stated: "[t]he specter of hate is unfortunately alive and well in the United States ....
The national report reveals a grim picture." 96 The Philadelphia Inquirer announced that the FBI and antibigotry groups report an alarming rise in hate crimes. 9 7 Since this was the first report, it is unclear how the newspaper was able to discern a "rise." USA Today simply stated that "no one needs a government report to know such [hate crime] offenses are rising." 98 The FBI statistics did not square with the much more alarmist reports put forward by advocacy groups for the same time period. For example, the FBI reported that 425 hate crimes nationwide were motivated by sexual-orientation bias. For the same period, the Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project reported 592 bias incidents based on sexual orientation in New York City alone. 99 Similarly, while the FBI for 1991 reported twelve "hate" murders based upon all federally-recognized prejudices, 10 0 Klanwatch reported twenty-seven murders motivated by bias. 10 1 Ironically, this statistical divergence led some of the groups which campaigned most vigorously for the passage of the Hate Crime Statistics Act to denounce the whole federal data collection project. Klanwatch, among the most ardent campaigners for the passage of the federal law, dismissed the first FBI statistics as "inadequate and nearly worthless."' 0 2 The second FBI report did not fare much better. [Vol. 86
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH HATE CRIME STATISTICS
The collection of hate crime statistics raises unique problems. The first problem is to define "hate crime." The second problem is to establish a reliable means for determining when a perpetrator's bias should transform an ordinary crime into a hate crime. The third problem is to decide which prejudices are relevant to counting hate crimes.
A. DEFINING THE HATE CRIME'S BIAS ELEMENT
Bias or prejudice is not easily defined. The InternationalEncyclpedia of the Human Sciences offers this guidance: "[P] rejudice is not a unitary phenomenon . . . . [I]t will take varying forms in different individuals."
104 If what constitutes prejudice seems vague, the scope of prejudice is virtually limitless. Some commentators argue that racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. are structural and pervasive influences in American cultural life.' 05 If they are correct, then it may be impossible to point to any interactions between members of different groups unaffected by prejudice, at least to some extent. According to the federal Hate Crime Statistics Act, an ordinary crime becomes a hate crime when "motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender's bias against a race, religion,-ethnic/national origin, group, or sexual orientation group." 10 6 The FBI defines ethnic prejudice as "[a] preformed negative opinion or attitude toward a group of persons of the same race or national origin who share common or similar traits, languages, customs, and traditions (e.g., Arabs, Hispanics, etc.)."107 Under this definition, practically any crime committed by a member of one group against a member of another could qualify as a hate crime.
B. MOTIVATION
There are serious problems in determining when a crime is motivated in whole, or in part, by bias. In addition to grave First Amendment issues which are beyond the scope of this paper, 1 08 determining motivation is a complex, frequently impossible, endeavor. Some, probably the majority, of hate crime offenders are not apprehended; their motivation must be inferred. 10 9 Even if apprehended, offenders will not provide insight into their motivations. In this situation, and in the situation where offenders are not caught, the coding of hate crimes depends upon information provided by the victim or inferred from the crime scene. Yet, the victim may be mistaken, hold personal biases that affect his or her judgment, be overly sensitive, have misperceived the incident, or simply be unreliable. While there will undoubtedly be some clear cases, many cases will be explicable in terms of a number of different motivations.
Consider a fight that occurs over a parking space, during the course of which a racial epithet is used. While obtaining a parking spot "motivates" the fight, under some statutory constructions the fight could be classified as a bias incident, subjecting the epithet utterer to a harsher criminal sanction.1 0 A much more complex problem would be presented by attempting to count the number of bias crimes that occurred, for example, during the L.A. riots in the aftermath of the Rodney King trial. Does all the property damage committed by African-Americans against Korean-owned stores count as bias crime?
C.
WHICH PREJUDICES COUNT?
Subjectivity also pervades the determination of which prejudices transform an ordinary crime into a hate crime. For example, whether to include sexual orientation in hate crime bills has stirred controversy in Congress and in some states.'' Given the sordid history of anti-gay violence, the exclusion of violence against gays and lesbians from any hate crime bill illustrates the point that the definition of hate crime is necessarily a political determination."1 2 Labelling and paying special attention to crimes motivated by certain biases arguably belittles crimes motivated by other biases that do not receive the same recognition. Are legislators delegitimating the victimization of workers who are targets of assaults because of pro-or anti-union biases or of Planned Parenthood employees who are threatened and attacked by violent anti-abortionists?" 3 Which predicate crimes count as hate crimes (when motivated by bias) is a legislative determination that also shapes the perceived size and scope of the hate crime epidemic."1 4 For example, the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 originally enumerated for data collection eight predicate crimes when motivated by certain biases: "murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, simple assault, intimidation, arson, and destruction, damage or vandalism of property.""1 5 Exercising Congressionally-authorized discretion, the Attorney General added robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft."1 6 However, certain crimes were not included. One might wonder, for example, why kidnapping, if motivated by bias, does not count as a hate crime?
The political act of classifying whether or not a crime will be counted as hate crime determines the size of the problem. If hate graffiti counts, then the hate crime rate will be formidable indeed. If only violent crimes motivated by bias are counted, then the hate crime rate will be considerably lower.
V. TELLING A DIFFERENT STORY WITH THE SAME DATA It is impossible to prove the null hypothesis: there is no hate crime epidemic. Even if we were to take on this quixotic task, "proof" would require the use of the same statistics criticized in this Article. Nevertheless, these same data can be used to tell a very different story than that which prevails in the media, government, and the legal academy.
We could, for example, point out that the Uniform Crime Report was able to identify only a small number of hate crimes. Similarly, the NYC Police Department, which has had a Bias Crime Unit for almost fifteen years, 1 7 reported 440 bias incidents in 1994;118 a relatively small number for a city which records 710,000 felony arrests each year.
There are sharply conflicting views of the same situations. While a 1991 Klanwatch report stated that the number of white supremacist groups had increased significantly, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation reported "membership of white supremacist groups in Georgia had been pretty stable over the past few years" and that there were doubts whether "there had been any increase in the number of groups in such states." 1 19 If it is true that "[t]he more people hear about hate crimes... the more likely they are to report such incidents to the ADL or the police," 120 then why hasn't the number of reported hate crimes vastly increased? Even if we accept the inevitability of underreporting, an epidemic of hate crime would mean that more people are affected. If more people are affected, there should be a significant increase in the number of people reporting these crimes. Yet there hasn't been, at least according to both the FBI and the NYPD.
Does it make sense to say that 4,588 reported hate crimes constitutes an epidemic when more than 14,872,883 index crimes were reported to the FBI in 1991?121 Should an epidemic be inferred from less than .039% of all reported crimes? In fact, the total number of hate crimes (most of which fall into the less serious crime categories) represents only a minute fraction of reported crimes. It is impossible to conclude that these numbers represent a trend one way or the other.
117 SeeJACOBS, CRIM. JusT. ETHics, supra note 86, at 55. [Vol. 86
VI. AHISToRICIsM
The socially constructed claim that hate crime has reached epidemic proportions flies in the face of history. It requires a certain amount of amnesia to state that "[n]ot since the days when the [Ku Klux] Klan regularly lynched people at the turn of the century... have we had anything like we have today," 1 22 or to state that "black students today face a level of hatred, prejudice and ignorance comparable to that of the days of Bull Connor, Lester Maddox and Orval Faubus." 123 It is far beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive history of racial and ethnic violence, much less anti-religious violence, anti-homosexual violence, and anti-gender violence in the United States; such a history would require nothing less than a multi-volume treatise. Suffice it to say, however, that the claim that the country is now experiencing unprecedented levels of violence in all these categories borders on the preposterous.
A. NATIVE AMERICANS
Almost from the moment European settlers arrived in this country, Native Americans were the target of bigotry and hatred. Viewed as savages, they were routinely removed from their land by force. The nineteenth century was punctuated with atrocities against Native Americans, and unfortunately, by "atrocities" we are not referring to name calling and racist leaflets. Department of War documents from the early 1800s reveal that the United States, in an effort to exterminate Native Americans, distributed blankets infested with the smallpox virus.
124 During the 1820s, in North Carolina, Georgia, and other southern states, the Cherokees were rounded up by the U.S. military and force-marched to Oklahoma. During this 3,000 mile march, known as the "Trail of Tears," hundreds of Cherokees died either at the hands of their military escorts, or from starvation and exposure. In Arizona and New Mexico, settlers and officials of the Catholic church attacked Navajo camps, kidnapping women and children to use as slaves. During the 1850s and 1860s, the U.S. military hunted down and killed Navajos in a carefully orchestrated campaign. They surrendered after their peach orchards and crops were burned. The Navajos also were subjected to a forced march, known as "The Long Beginning in the 1820s and extending into the twentieth century, a mainstream political movement developed that was based on hatred of Catholics, Jews, and recent immigrants, primarily Irish, Italians, and Germans. Nativist leaders were not simply a fringe element on the American scene. They were elected to political office and published widely-read anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant newspapers. During the 1820-30s, the movement was called "nativism"; it then metamorphosed into the "Know Nothing Party." Later in the century it went by the name of American Protective Association (APA). In the twentieth century, it was again called nativism.
The rhetoric of the nativists encouraged hatred. Catholic churches were burned. Gangs and mobs attacked priests and immigrants in Massachusetts, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. 13 7 In the 1840s, Philadelphia was the scene of sporadic rioting over the course of three months. Anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic violence flourished into the twentieth century. Anti-semitism became a force to be reckoned with and was rampant in all areas of American life. Newspaper classified advertisements for employment, housing, and vacation rentals openly declared thatJews were not acceptable.' 3 9 Ironically, one of the most virulent American anti-semites of the first half of the twentieth century was a Catholic priest, Charles Coughlin. Father Coughlin's church had been the target of many Klan-orchestrated cross burnings. During the late 1920s, Coughlin began broadcasting his sermons on radio. Once the Great Depression hit, Coughlin began focusing on economic and social issues. An avowed enemy of the New Deal, Coughlin founded the National Union for Social Justice (NUSJ). By 1936, NUSJ recruited over five million members. His radio broadcasts, which boasted an audience of at least ten million listeners, were peppered with anti-semitic attacks; he praised Nazi Germany and the Third Reich. We believe that the same ahistoricism that characterizes recent pronouncements of unprecedented violence against ethnic and racial groups affects claims about prejudice-motivate violence against women, gays, and lesbians. Until recently, however, gays and lesbians feared to openly affirm or demonstrate their sexual orientation. Now it is routine. Violence against women has always been high, but we know of no reason to believe that it is higher now than earlier in the 138 Id. at 56. 139 CARLSON & COLBURN, supra note 125, at 279. 140 Id. at 269.
[Vol. 86 century, when women all too often had no where to go to report their victimization.
VII. CONCLUSION Professor Abramovsky asserts that, "no one seriously questions the severity of the problem [of bias crime] .-41 We do. The uncritical acceptance of a hate crime epidemic is unfortunate. It distorts discourse about the allocation of scarce resources both within and without the criminal justice system. Further, this pessimistic and alarmist portrayal of a divided conflict-ridden community may create a selffulfilling prophesy and exacerbate societal divisions. 14 2 Minority groups may have good reasons for claiming the U.S. is in the throes of an epidemic. An "epidemic" demands attention, remedial actions, resources, and reparations. The electronic and print media also have reasons to support the existence of a rampant hate crime epidemic. Crime sells-so does racism, sexism, and homophobia. Garden variety crime has become mundane. The law and order drama has to be revitalized if it is to command attention.
History may show that modem society has actually experienced a reduction in violent crime against marginal groups. It is hardly necessary to point out our nation's history of bias: Native Americans were brutally murdered as the West was conquered; the blood and sweat of Chinese and other immigrant workers stain the expanses of railroad trackg atross the midwest; lynchings of blacks were once common; violence against various European immigrants and Jews was a fact of life. Clearly, violence motivated by racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and other biases is not new.
Perhaps what is new is greater intolerance of prejudice. The conclusion that hate crime has reached epidemic proportions today simply evinces the fact that bias crime is now much less acceptable and that victimized groups have a special social and political status. While it is possible to understand how and why the picture of a "hate crime epidemic" has come to dominate the American imagination, it is doubtful that this picture depicts reality.
